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 Introduction 
 
This article concerns the question whether free trade can be seen as a collective action problem. 
More specifically, I investigate whether one key characteristic of collective action is present in 
the case of trade: a common interest. I argue that while states at an aggregate level might have 
such a common interest, this does not automatically mean that governments will advance this 
interest in practice. Whether they will depends on accountability mechanisms within the state. 
I will show that within various accountability systems, there are reasons why governments 
will not advance the aggregate state interest. This opens up the floor to a more power-driven 
perspective on trade. I will first elaborate briefly on how the theory of collective action can be 
applied to trade and why states should have a common interest in free trade. Secondly, I will 
investigate why democratic and autocratic regimes respectively, might not advance this 
common interest. This will lead to my argument of viewing trade from a power perspective.  
 
Trade as a collective action problem 
 
One could think of trade as a collective action problem. The groundwork for this theory, as is 
well known, is laid by Olson (1971, 1982). Olson argues that some group of individuals may 
have a common interest in a public good, but that this is not a sufficient condition for the good 
to be provided because of free-riding incentives. Every individual faces incentives to not 
contribute to the costs of the good and reap the benefits of the contribution of others. The result 
is that the good will not materialize, unless certain specific conditions are met. In the case of 
free trade, this means that although all states have a collective interest in free trade, every state 
has an incentive to protect its own producers while benefitting from other states opening up 
their domestic markets. But what if they don’t? Then we need to create international 
arrangements that allow weak states to protect themselves or be compensated for not doing 
so. In this regard, free trade might become a weapon of the strong against the weak. These 
incentives may explain the difficulties states experience in building a global or regional free-
trade regime.  
 
As we can see, one essential characteristic of a collective action problem is a common interest. 
This is a pre-condition for seeing any problem as a collective action problem. Applying this to 
trade, it seems clear what this common interest should be. Every basic economics textbook (for 
example Ray 1998) will tell us that free trade will rise aggregate welfare in all countries 
engaging in it. Of course, it will also tell us that while countries as a whole gain, some 
individuals or better still, not just individuals – major economic groups whose costs make 
them internationally uncompetitive within countries might loose from free trade. This point 
will be important later.  
 
Before moving on to the question whether governments do advance this aggregate interest, I 
would like to make one more point. Within the collective action model, there seems to be little 
scope for power differences. Larger actors within the group do not gain disproportionally to 
their size. On the contrary, Olson (1971) argues that larger actors might bear a 
disproportionately large share of the costs, should the collective action problem be solved. The 
problem with the Olson model is that it is highly individualistic, and ignores all of the social 
mechanisms that exist based on altruism and long-term reciprocity, to moderate or even 
overcome free-riding. His analysis is often true, but it often is not. The interesting and difficult 
question is when and why it is true or is not. Why do people ever sacrifice their own interests 
for a common cause?  
 
Do governments advance the aggregate state interest?  
 
It is established that in theory states have a collective interest. To see trade as a collective action 
problem assumes that governments do advance this state interest. Whether they do this, depends 
on the relationship between the state and its citizens. What do citizens demand from the state? 
And how accountable is the state to these demands? This in turn partly depends on the regime-
type; to what extent it is democratic or autocratic. Is there such a thing as a Pareto optimal 
collective interest that holds for everyone? I have yet to identify a policy change that does not 
disadvantage some people while advantaging others. Hence there are rare situations where 
governments can identify a universally valid ‘collective interest’ that they can satisfy; 
particular regimes identify their own goals and work to achieve them.  
 
Their opponents try to discredit them in order to replace them. Optimally governments should 
attempt to manage compromises between conflicting interests – which is very much the case 
in trade policy where some groups (low cost exporters) might benefit from free trade, while 
others (high-cost local industries) might loose. Understanding how these processes work out 
is not helped by free-rider theory, because these negotiations are carried out by 
professionalised interest groups. What is crucial is differences in levels of influence over 
political decision-makers. I will investigate different regimes, ranging from perfect democracy 
to perfect autocracy and argue that reasons exist for the governments of each type not to 
advance its citizens aggregate interest in the case of trade. These regimes are of course ideal 
types and I do not claim that they exist in reality. However, they might be useful tools for our 
analysis.  
 
Perfect democracy 
 
First assume a perfect democracy, as a perfect political market. Every citizen has equal power 
to influence the government and the government is perfectly accountable to the majority of its 
citizens. Will this lead to a government advancing free trade? One problem might be: although 
the total value of free trade might be greater to society, there may not be a numerical majority of 
citizens benefitting from free trade. This raises the distribution problem – but it is difficult to 
see how we can say that society benefits when a majority of its members loses. This also raises 
problems about how we define the ‘collective interest.’ Therefore, this causes a perfectly 
democratic government to not advance the aggregate state interest of free trade.  
 
But even if one assumes that a majority does have an interest in free trade or that the 
government taxes the ‘winners’ from trade to compensate the ‘losers’, (Note that the winners 
will often be foreigners and the losers nationals) this is why equitable trading relationships 
depend upon viable global governance – in this case the ability of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) to guarantee equitable outcomes. It is not clear that the state will advance 
this common interest. Rodrik (1998a) points out that the transaction costs of compensating the 
losers might greatly outweigh the aggregate benefits from trade. Furthermore, incomplete 
information about which individual may be a ‘winner’ or a ‘loser’ might stop [refrain] some of 
the beneficiaries of trade liberalization from supporting it. The necessary majority of citizens 
supporting free trade might not exist, even under these conditions.    
 
Even in a perfect democracy, it is thus not clear that the government will advance the 
aggregate state interest of free trade.  Begging the question, “Is it a state interest or a social 
interest, or are they the same?  
 
Interest group democracy 
 
A perfect democracy is [might] not be a very realistic assumption. In reality, interest groups 
are generally more powerful in determining policy than individuals. This allows for a 
government being disproportionally accountable to some of its citizens.  
 
The first argument again comes from Olson (1982). Interest groups face their own collective 
action problems. Smaller groups have disproportionate power for collective action. This is 
very problematic when we are dealing with organised interest groups based on general class 
interests – business, workers etc. Peak organisations like the Trade Union Congress and 
Confederation of British Industries have immense influence because they have been able to 
mobilise the resources needed to overcome collective action problems.  
 
Their limited size makes it easier to organize themselves, as the transaction costs are smaller, 
it is easier to create selective incentives, there is more social control and bargaining processes 
can be more binding. These limited interest groups are willing to make society incur 
disproportionate costs, in order to attain their own narrow goal. In the context of trade, this 
means that small, well-defined groups like industry lobbies, may organise more easily than 
large, diffuse groups (consumers). They can influence the government to refrain from 
advancing societies common goal, to attain their limited group benefit.  
 
A second argument related to interest groups comes from Moe (1995). He emphasises that 
competing interest groups may hamper bureaucratic processes by putting in place inefficient 
institutions. This may also show why states may not effectively advance a common interest. 
Variables that determine the relative access to power of these interest groups may include; 
constitutional arrangements, wealth that enables them to organise, the existence of a mass base 
of people marginalised by existing arrangements. These issues look very different to weak 
producers living in Least Developing Countries (LDCs) than to strong ones living in 
Developed Countries (DCs).  
 
Accepting that imperfections in the democratic process, allow some individuals or groups to 
have more influence on the government than others, increases the scope for a government in 
not advancing the aggregate interest of the state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accountability failure 
 
This category of regimes includes all kinds of regimes that have an electoral democracy, but 
experience frequent accountability failure. Whereas in the previous category governments are 
more accountable to certain citizens than others, in this category the government ceases to be 
accountable to any of its citizens to a certain extent.  
 
The World Bank (2004) highlights many ways in which a government might not be 
accountable to its citizens. Trade policy is a typical example of what the World Bank calls the 
“long route of accountability”. Citizens must voice their wishes (for free trade) to the 
government, while the government needs to control the providing agencies (customs offices, 
and the allocation of foreign exchange). This long route of accountability has a high risk of 
failure, as the World Bank points out.  
 
The risk of the providing agencies acting on their own behalf (extracting bribes before letting 
products into the country) is a realistic scenario in trade. The possibilities of holding the 
providers directly accountable (the “short route”) are very limited. Again actual outcomes will 
be a function of levels of political capital in society – where strong economic pressure groups 
exist, and governments face re-election, outcomes will be determined by those that can 
persuade governments that they should do what they want. Many different variables influence 
the ability of elites or subordinate groups to influence or even capture power that will be 
contextually specific and a function of the levels of social and political capital in any society.  
 
Failing accountability mechanisms create favourable conditions for elite capture. Rodrik 
(1998b) points out that trade policies might be especially prone to this, because it creates large 
flows of revenue in the form of tariffs.  Failing accountability mechanisms make it likely that 
the government will not take on aggregate interest as its own.  
 
Perfect autocracy 
 
Let us now consider the final extreme: perfect autocracy. This would be a government aiming 
to extract maximum revenue from society.  Olson (1993) argues that while a ‘stationary bandit’ 
might further overall welfare to some extent, this will not be the optimal point for society. Why 
not? If his argument is totally rational it is crucial to realise its best to maximise economic 
welfare. It makes little difference to firms if they are taxed through tariffs or some other way. 
The issue is not trade policy but the conflict of interest between politicians and officials on the 
one hand as well as capitalists on the other. It thus seems unlikely that a perfect autocrat will 
propose perfectly free trade, especially since tariffs are an easy way to extract revenue, as we 
have seen. If the autocrat has a limited time horizon, the problem is aggravated, according to 
Olson. Since no government is there forever, the likelihood of a perfect autocrat advancing free 
trade diminishes even further.  
 
Compared to the other ideal regime types, the perfect autocratic government is unlikely to 
advance the aggregate interest of the state. All these examples show that, whilst free trade 
might be in the interest of states as a whole, there are reasons for all regime types not to further 
this interest. The high likelihood of states not advancing the collective interest, makes it 
extremely difficult to see trade as a collective action problem.  
 Enter power perspective 
 
The conclusion that many kinds of mechanisms persuade governments not to advance the 
aggregate interest, opens up the possibility that goals of states will not coincide. With what? 
Those of society as a whole? We have seen that imagining the possibility of an overall collective 
interest is highly problematic, since governments actually exist to mediate between the 
demands of groups with conflicting interests. It also allows states to strive for certain sub-
goals. A state may want free trade in certain goods, but will resist free trade in other sectors 
where it has been influenced by interest groups.  
 
It may want to abolish highly restrictive export taxes, but be unwilling to stop taxing imports, 
because the government derives a lot of revenue from this. This makes it clear that 
governments are unlikely to have a common interest during trade negotiations, which in turn 
makes it useful to see trade as a power struggle instead of a collective action problem. These 
might be key issues in regional integration, that arise if we are making a realistic analysis of 
the options confronting both governments, societies and the particular interests that constitute 
them. To deal with them effectively we need to look at the trade theory literature.  
 
This argument is partly in line with Gruber (2001). He postulates that some states may prefer 
the (non-free trade) status quo over free trade. However, the power of other actors to create a 
free trade regime without them (termed go-it-alone power), excludes the status quo as an 
option for these states. The second-best option might be to go along with the powerful actors, 
although that leaves them worse off than under trade protection. As a case study, Gruber takes 
the NAFTA. His argument depends on the assumption that Mexico is worse off under NAFTA 
than it would have been under the status quo.    
 
The difference between Gruber’s argument and mine is, that he tries to show that NAFTA was 
not in Mexico’s interest. His argument basically is, that free trade caused political upheaval in 
Mexico and required a painful adaptation process, which diminished growth. This is not a 
very strong argument however, as one might say these are short term effects and that it is still 
in the long term aggregate interest of Mexico to go along with NAFTA. My argument is, that 
it is not necessary to show that Mexico as a whole is worse off under NAFTA. It may be 
sufficient to show that the government does not advance the aggregate economic interest of 
the country.  
 
This seems likely, since the regime in Mexico can be characterized as clientelistic and ruled by 
elites. Mexico does not have to be worse off under NAFTA to argue that force played a role in 
it joining NAFTA. The government might simply not advance the aggregate interest. But then 
again, it is important to recognise that some groups’ interests supported by others opposed 
NAFTA in Meixco, and the USA. Actual outcomes have also had ambiguous results, and 
probably benefited Mexico more. Gruber fails to recognise these complexities in order to justify 
his overall claim that countries can be forced to join global organisations even when it is not 
in their interest. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A central feature of the collective action model is a common interest between atomised 
individuals. Although all states in some theories have a common interest in free trade, I have 
showed that different regime types face different reasons for not taking this common interest 
as their own. This erodes the usefulness of the collective action perspective for analysing global 
trade policy. Power perspectives, such as Gruber’s model of go-it-alone power might be more 
useful for the case of trade. In this context, it is not necessary to show that a state is worse off 
as a whole, it is sufficient to show that the government does not advance the aggregate interest. 
In this sense, the findings in this article could strengthen the explanatory power of the power 
perspective.  
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